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“POLITICAL QUESTIONS”: AN INVASIVE
SPECIES INFECTING THE COURTS
PHILIP WEINBERG†
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent court rulings have distorted the hoary “political
questions” doctrine into an excuse to evade the courts’ responsibility
to decide serious justiciable issues in environmental law. Unless
overturned, these decisions not to decide important legal questions
will carve out an unwarranted escape hatch and thwart effective
judicial redress for environmental harms. And, ironically, the
weightier the legal issue, the more likely these courts are to dodge it.
Last year, the federal district court in People of California v.
General Motors Corp. (GMC) dismissed a public nuisance suit
seeking damages from the major auto manufacturers for injuries to
1
These
the state’s environment stemming from climate change.
asserted injuries included severe loss of water supply due to melting
2
snow pack, increased risk of flooding, beach erosion, and forest fires.
The court concluded that this public nuisance action, no different
from hundreds of others brought by states except for the higher
stakes involved, was a political question and therefore beyond the
court’s jurisdiction, since it “would have an inextricable effect on
interstate commerce and foreign policy—issues constitutionally
committed to the political branches of government,”3 and because
there was, in the court’s view, no “manageable method of discerning
the entities that are creating and contributing to the alleged
4
nuisance.”

† Professor of Law, St. John’s University School of Law. J.D., Columbia Law School,
1958. The author, co-author of Understanding Environmental Law (2d ed. 2007) and editor of
Environmental Law: Cases and Materials (rev. 3d ed. 2006), is indebted to Delano Ladd and
Craig Lutterbein (St. John’s University School of Law 2008 and 2009) for research assistance in
preparing this article.
1. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007).
2. Id. at *2.
3. Id. at *13.
4. Id. at *15.
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Two years earlier, another federal court rebuffed a suit by
Connecticut, New York, and several other states seeking to enjoin, as
a public nuisance, carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from the nation’s
five largest electric utilities, again citing their impact on global
warming.5 In Connecticut v. American Electric Power Co. (AEP) the
6
court likewise found this to be a political question for similar reasons.
Yet other federal courts have more sensibly rejected political
question defenses. These courts have sustained actions for damages
in a variety of environmental areas ranging from injuries from
7
Hurricane Katrina to contamination of water supply caused by
methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE), a pollutant added to gasoline to
8
help comply with air quality standards.
II. THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE
The political question doctrine, or the reluctance of federal
courts to decide political questions, has clear and fixed limits. Its
genesis lies in Chief Justice Marshall’s observation in Marbury v.
Madison that “where the heads of departments are the political or
confidential agents of the executive, merely to execute the will of the
President, or rather to act in cases in which the executive possesses a
constitutional or legal discretion, . . . their acts are only politically
examinable.”9 But Marshall went on to rule for the Court that the
government’s legal duty to furnish Marbury’s promised commission
to serve as justice of the peace was not such a situation, that he had a
“right to the commission; a refusal to deliver which is a plain violation
of that right, for which the laws of this country afford him a
remedy.”10 This decision, establishing the power of judicial review, of
course veered off to hold the provision of the Judiciary Act of 1789
empowering the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in its
original jurisdiction cases to be unconstitutional.11 The political
question doctrine—actually grounded in the courts’ reluctance to
invade the constitutionally allocated powers of the executive and

5. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
6. Id. at 273.
7. Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., 467 F. Supp. 2d 676 (E.D. La. 2006).
8. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d 291
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
10. Id. at 168.
11. Id. at 138.
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legislative branches of government12—thereafter assumed a carefullycircumscribed life of its own.13
In another salient decision closer to our own day, Baker v. Carr,
the Supreme Court ruled that claims that states’ failure to
reapportion legislative districts over decades, resulting in gross
inequality of representation due to the enormously varied population
of districts, were not political questions.14 In so holding, Justice
Brennan, writing for the Court, set forth the modern test for
nonjusticiable political questions: are they issues “decided, or to be
decided, by a political branch of government coequal with this
Court,” or leading to “embarrassment of our government abroad,” or
“policy determinations for which judicially manageable standards are
lacking”?15
Illustrative of genuine political questions are the early cases
seeking judicial rulings as to whether a state has the republican form
of government assured by the Constitution’s Guaranty Clause.16 In
Luther v. Borden, where the plaintiff contended that Rhode Island, in
a comic-opera state of insurrection in the early 1840s, lacked a
republican government, the Court found that issue to be one for
which no judicial standard existed, and which, under the Constitution,
must be resolved by Congress.17 Again, in Georgia v. Stanton,
18
challenging the post-Civil War military occupation of the South, and
Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, a claim that
enacting laws by popular initiative denied a republican government,19
the Court rebuffed as political questions attempts to invoke the
20
Guaranty Clause.
Similarly, some issues of foreign policy, such as whether a state
21
of war exists between the United States and another country, or
whether a treaty remains valid,22 have been ruled political questions

12. Id. at 166.
13. See generally Martin H. Redish, Judicial Review and the Political Question, 79 NW. U. L.
REV. 1031, 1033–39 (1984) (discussing the history, scope, and rationale of the political question
doctrine).
14. 369 U.S. 186, 209 (1962).
15. Id. at 226.
16. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
17. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849).
18. 73 U.S. 50, 50–53 (1867).
19. 223 U.S. 118, 133–37 (1912).
20. See Stanton, 73 U.S. at 77–78; Pacific States Tel., 223 U.S. at 133.
21. Campbell v. Clinton, 203 F.3d 19, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (Silberman, J., concurring).
22. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
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for the reasons advanced in Baker v. Carr. But, significantly, claims
that a treaty interferes with citizens’ rights protected under the
Constitution are not political questions and will be decided by the
courts, as in Kent v. Dulles23 (concerning limits on the right to travel)
and Reid v. Covert24 (regarding whether an executive agreement with
another country denies the right to jury trial to dependents of
members of the Armed Forces serving overseas).
One issue the Supreme Court has wrestled with over the past few
decades is whether a challenge to the gerrymandering of
congressional or state legislative districts—drawing districting lines to
disproportionately benefit the party in power—is a political question.
The practice has been challenged as a denial of equal protection as in
Baker v. Carr, which, as noted, dealt with state legislatures’ failure to
25
The Court in
reapportion districts to reflect population shifts.
subsequent decisions ruled that this practice denies equal protection,
and enunciated the one person-one vote rule.26 Then in Davis v.
27
Bandemer, a divided Court found gerrymandering to be justiciable,
though three justices dissented, considering the issue a political
question.28 More recently, in Vieth v. Jubelirer,29 four justices ruled
30
the practice to be a political question, while five found it justiciable.
Claims of gerrymandering on racial rather than partisan grounds have
routinely been held justiciable and decided on equal protection
grounds.31
Justice Brennan, in Baker v. Carr, summed up well the
requirements of a nonjusticiable political question as “a textually
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for
32
nonjudicial discretion . . . .”

23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

357 U.S. 116 (1958).
354 U.S. 1 (1957).
369 U.S. 186, 187–88 (1962).
See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 557–64 (1964).
478 U.S. 109, 113 (1986).
See id. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
See id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 317–55 (dissents by four justices).
See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999).
369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
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Shortly after that decision, the Supreme Court resoundingly
rejected a political question defense in Powell v. McCormack.33 The
House of Representatives refused to seat Powell, elected by his New
York constituents, after a House committee concluded he had
“wrongfully diverted House funds.”34 The defendant, Speaker of the
House, claimed this was a political question since the Constitution
provides that “each House [of Congress] shall be the Judge of [the]
Qualifications of its own Members.”35 But the Court, in an opinion
written by Chief Justice Warren, held that the issue was not a political
question since other provisions of the Constitution list precisely which
qualifications the House may consider: age, citizenship, and state
36
residence. And, with striking applicability to the recent climate
change rulings, the Court added that the nature of our “government
requires that federal courts on occasion interpret the Constitution in a
manner at variance with the construction given the document by
another branch. The alleged conflict that such an adjudication may
cause cannot justify the courts’ avoiding their constitutional
responsibility.”37
If true as to interpreting the Constitution itself, how much more
apt is this holding to litigation interpreting statutes, like the Clean Air
38
Act, that federal courts routinely construe?
III. ENVIRONMENTAL SUITS: POLITICAL QUESTIONS?
In In re MTBE Products Liability Litigation, the court sensibly
decided against dismissing as a political question a suit for damages
for harm to public water supplies from methyl tertiary butyl ether
(MTBE).39 The defendant chemical manufacturers argued that the
suit involved “broad policy goals which can only be achieved by
replacing MTBE with ethanol throughout the national fuel supply,”
requiring the court to “balance the ‘relevant economic,
40
environmental, energy and security interests’” at stake. But the
court found that the defendants had “blurred the line between a
determination of whether defendants are liable for water pollution

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

395 U.S. 486 (1969).
Id. at 492.
Id. at 513 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 1).
Id. at 520–21 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2).
Id. at 549.
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2000).
438 F. Supp. 2d 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
Id. at 300.
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caused by MTBE and a policy determination regarding the
composition of the country’s fuel supply.”41 The court went on to
distinguish Connecticut v. AEP, where it concluded that “Congress
and the Executive had issued explicit statements” on climate change
and “specifically refused to ‘impose limits on carbon dioxide
42
emissions.’” That may have helped the MTBE court avoid the AEP
ruling from the same district,43 but in the end, neither suit raises
political questions under Baker v. Carr.44 The very failure of the other
two branches of the federal government to act against climate
45
change is precisely what frees the judiciary to do so, just as with
legislative redistricting46 and, for that matter, public school
47
segregation. As the MTBE court noted, as far back as Marbury the
Supreme Court recognized that “[t]he very essence of civil liberty . . .
[is] the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws,
whenever he receives an injury.”48
Similarly, in Barasich v. Columbia Gulf Transmission Co., the
court rebuffed a political question defense to a suit for damages from
Hurricane Katrina, which the plaintiffs claimed were exacerbated by
oil and gas exploration that reduced the protective qualities of
49
The defendants contended that since
wetlands in Louisiana.
regulation of wetlands, which absorb much of the impact of coastal
storms, is the province of the executive and legislative branches
through enforcement of the Clean Water Act50 and similar state
laws,51 there are no judicially manageable standards to weigh the
coastal erosion that the destruction of these wetlands causes.52 The
court sensibly ruled that judicially manageable standards plainly exist

41. Id.
42. Id. at 301.
43. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
44. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
45. See e.g., Barry G. Rabe et al., State Competition as a Source Driving Climate Change
Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 2–3, 45 (2005) (noting the development of climate change
policy initiatives at the state level in response to federal inaction, and the valuable function the
judicial process provides for state participation in the federal regulatory process “when there is
stagnation in politics”).
46. See Baker, 369 U.S. 186.
47. Cf. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
48. In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether (MTBE) Prods. Liab. Litig., 438 F. Supp. 2d 291, 299
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803)).
49. 467 F. Supp. 2d 676, 688–89 (E.D. La. 2006).
50. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2000).
51. See, e.g., N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW art. 17 (McKinney 2007).
52. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 682.
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for determining the extent to which drilling in wetlands caused
erosion, and to which the erosion worsened storm damage.53 It relied
on a Fifth Circuit ruling rejecting an identical defense to a suit
seeking damages for a fish pass, an artificially-created waterway,
which allegedly contributed to coastal erosion.54 And, the court
noted, the lack of judicially manageable standards defense is
55
especially inappropriate in a tort action.
Although the Barasich court distinguished Connecticut v. AEP as
56
a suit for an injunction, its logic applies to that case, and to GMC as
well. The fact that environmentally harmful activity is potentially
subject to regulation by legislative and executive action in no way
transforms it into a political question or strips the courts of authority
to decide it.
Again, in In Re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation (In re
Agent Orange), a suit by Vietnamese nationals seeking damages for
exposure to Agent Orange, the defoliant applied by the United States
military during the Vietnam War, the court, while dismissing the
action on the merits, denied that it raised a political question.57 As
the court noted, some actions involving international law issues have
been dismissed as political questions, such as whether a president may
abrogate a treaty58 and the extent to which treaties preclude suits for
59
reparations by World War II and Holocaust victims. But, as In re
Agent Orange pointed out, these do not apply to actions for injunctive
relief or damages asserting legally recognizable injury, such as in AEP
or GMC.60

53. Id. at 684.
54. Gordon v. Texas, 153 F.3d 190 (5th Cir. 1998).
55. Barasich, 467 F. Supp. 2d at 684 (citing McKay v. United States, 703 F.2d 464, 470 (10th
Cir. 1983)).
56. Id. at 685–86 (citing Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005)).
57. 373 F. Supp. 2d 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 517 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2008).
58. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
59. Burger-Fischer v. Degussa AG, 65 F. Supp. 2d 248 (D.N.J. 1999). The German
government later established a foundation specifically empowered to hear such claims. See In re
Nazi Era Cases Against German Defendants Litig., 129 F. Supp. 2d 370, 379 (D.N.J. 2001).
60. See In re Agent Orange, 373 F. Supp. 2d at 67; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,
249 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that a suit brought against a Bosnian national under the Alien Tort
Act by victims of atrocities committed in Bosnia was justiciable, noting that “[n]ot every case
‘touching foreign relations’ is nonjusticiable[,]” and that “cases present[ing] issues that arise in a
politically charged context . . . does not transform them into cases involving nonjusticiable
political questions”).
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Most notably and recently, the Supreme Court, in Rasul v. Bush,
denied a political question defense in an Alien Tort Statute61 and
habeas corpus action by Guantanamo detainees challenging the
62
legality of their detention. Likewise, the Supreme Court had earlier
found no political question when it heard a suit brought to direct the
Secretary of Commerce to restrict trade with Japan for alleged
violations of the International Whaling Convention.63 Though the
Court was to deny the injunction the plaintiffs sought, it ruled that
only “those controversies which revolve around policy choices and
value determinations constitutionally committed for resolution to the
halls of Congress or the confines of the Executive Branch” are barred
from judicial review.64
Closer to the AEP and GMC scenarios is the Supreme Court’s
decision in an early water-quality case, Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals
65
Corp. Ohio invoked the Court’s original jurisdiction over suits by a
66
state, seeking an injunction against a chemical manufacturer
67
allegedly discharging pollutants into its waters. Just as in AEP, the
68
state asserted a public nuisance. While ultimately declining to hear
the suit as an original jurisdiction action, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Harlan, explicitly distinguished suits asserting political
questions and relied on a series of cases decided by the Court which
were brought to abate public nuisances with interstate
consequences.69 Finding no political question, it ruled that “precedent
leads almost ineluctably to the conclusion that we are empowered to
resolve this dispute.”70
This clear, unequivocal rejection of the political question defense
by the Supreme Court, congruent with the decisions discussed here,
reveals the illogic of the AEP and GMC anomalies. The complexity,

61. 542 U.S. 466, 484–85 (2004) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
62. Id. at 480–83.
63. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc’y, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
64. Id.
65. 401 U.S. 493 (1971).
66. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (“In all cases . . . in which a State shall be Party, the
Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction”); 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(3) (2000) (“The Supreme
Court shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction of . . . [a]ll actions . . . by a State against
the citizens of another State . . . .”).
67. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. at 494–95.
68. Id. at 495.
69. Id. at 496 (citing Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907)).
70. Id.
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or the high stakes, of litigation concerning climate change71 should not
bar the courts from hearing suits that are in all other respects no
different from any other action to enjoin a public nuisance. The
courts have long and consistently rejected assertions that the
enactment of regulatory statutes like the Clean Air Act and Clean
Water Act preempt states from public nuisance actions.72 The fact
that Congress has failed to seriously address climate change73 reduces,
not strengthens, the notion that the issue is not justiciable.
The Supreme Court had no problem ruling that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) should consider adopting
standards to control CO2 as a pollutant under the Clean Air Act. In
Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court upheld the state’s standing and went
on to so direct the Agency.74 If there was no political question in that
case—the Government seems not to have even advanced that
argument, and the Court flatly stated that the suit did not “seek
adjudication of a political question”75—there surely is none where, as
in AEP and GMC, states use their more traditional and time-honored
powers to abate a public nuisance.
IV. THE BAKER V. CARR CRITERIA
Justice Brennan’s cogent analysis in Baker v. Carr, after
discussing and easily distinguishing rulings holding issues involving
the validity of treaties and the Guaranty Clause to be political
questions,76 specified several types of suits as nonjusticiable: those
raising a “question . . . to be decided, by a political branch of
government coequal with this Court[,]” those posing “risk [of]
embarrassment of our government abroad, or [of] grave disturbance

71. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1462–63 (2007) (noting EPA’s
arguments that regulation of carbon dioxide emissions from automobiles under the Clean Air
Act might conflict with current executive branch programs aimed at voluntary emissions
reductions, and that such regulation might impair the President’s ability to negotiate an
international climate change agreement).
72. See, e.g., Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498–500 (1987); Leo v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 538 N.Y.S.2d 844, 847 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); Miotke v. City of Spokane, 678 P.2d 803, 805
(Wash. 1984). But see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 327–32 (1981) (stating that the
federal common-law of nuisance was preempted by Clean Water Act).
73. See, e.g., Rabe et al., supra note 45, at 2–3 (discussing legislative and executive failures
at the federal level to take action on climate change).
74. 127 S. Ct. at 1452–58.
75. Id. at 1452.
76. 369 U.S. 186, 209–12 (1962).
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at home,” or those seeking “policy determinations for which judicially
manageable standards are lacking.”77
None of these suffices to derail the climate change suits in GMC
or AEP. There is plainly no issue in these actions to be decided by
another branch of government. That could be said of any public
nuisance or similar suit seeking judicial relief where administrative
agencies such as the EPA have failed to act. The Supreme Court
explicitly rebuffed an asserted political question defense in Wyandotte
Chemicals, which raised similar issues.78 The greater stakes here79
should not lead to an opposite result.
Nor do these suits pose any risk of embarrassing the United
States government abroad. Whatever embarrassment this country
has suffered from the climate change issue has stemmed from its
failure to act, i.e., to ratify the Kyoto Agreement,80 not from attempts
to remedy that failure.
Little need be said of concern over possible disturbances to the
government from concerns over climate change. And there are surely
judicially manageable standards to enjoin, or award damages for,
injuries stemming from climate change.81 Whether those remedies are
warranted is, of course, an issue the courts ought to decide. They
should not disqualify themselves by concluding that these concerns
are not justiciable.
V. CONCLUSION
The political question doctrine is inapplicable to suits to enjoin,
or recover damages for, environmental—and particularly climate
change—injury. Its use by courts amounts to an unwarranted
expansion of that limited doctrine into areas where, historically, the
courts have been available to render justice to aggrieved parties.

77. Id. at 226.
78. See Ohio v. Wyandotte Chems. Corp., 401 U.S. 493, 496 (1971).
79. See supra note 71.
80. See Stephen Seplow, Why the U.S. Draws Fire over Kyoto Protocol While Other Nations
Don’t, PHILA. INQUIRER, July 24, 2001, available at http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/
summary_0286-8322358_ITM.
81. See Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165 (2d Cir. 1976) (enjoining air pollution);
Ayers v. Township of Jackson, 525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987) (damages for environmental harm).

